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This article argues that the extent to which political office-holders can effectively attain and 
wield authority is a function of the stock of ‘leadership capital.’ Drawing on the concept of 
political capital, we define leadership capital as aggregate authority composed of three 
dimensions: skills; relations; and reputation of a leader. Leadership capital ebbs and flows 
over time within a trajectory of acquisition, expenditure and inevitable depreciation. We 
present a Leadership Capital Index (LCI) that systematically maps out the three broad areas 
combining concrete measures with interpretive aspects. This can be used as a tool for 
systematically tracking and comparing the political fortunes of leaders in a way that is both 
more nuanced and robust than exclusive reliance on the latest approval ratings. We offer an 
illustrative case study of Tony Blair demonstrating the LCI. We conclude by discerning 
several promising paths for future development of the LCI. 
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Political Leadership and Political Capital 
Political commentators routinely refer to political capital as the degree of popularity 
(measured usually through opinion polls or votes), mandate or momentum enjoyed by 
professional politicians and leaders. Politicians themselves often refer to political capital 
when comparing their capacity to mobilize people with others (Schugurensky 2000: 5). At a 
basic heuristic level the capital analogy allows us to understand the fundamental, but often 
overlooked, difference between leading and office-holding in politics and management. 
Office-holding is about gathering and conserving leadership capital, leading is about 
spending it purposefully whilst retaining enough to survive, recharge and continue. 
Exercising leadership is crucially about laying one’s authority on the line to name unpleasant 
realities, pursue unpopular policies and cut deals. Leadership is about ‘teaching reality’ 
(Hargrove 1998), about ‘disappointing followers at a rate they can stand’, about ‘regulating 
distress’ among stakeholders and publics in order to get them to do the often painful 
‘adaptive work’ involved in forging behavioural and social change (Heifetz 1994). Leadership 
is therefore a ‘dangerous’ enterprise in which ‘staying alive’ as a leader is not a given. What 
really counts is not position but authority. Exercising leadership puts leaders’ authority 
continuously at risk (Heifetz and Linsky 2002).  
With so much riding on it, it becomes relevant to be able to assess the state of a leader’s 
authority in a way that is reliable yet parsimonious, relatively precise yet able to register the 
fluidity of public authority. So far, despite centuries of writing about it, the notion of 
authority has not delivered any such tool. In this article we deploy an analogy from the 
world of finance and economics and conceive of political authority as ‘capital’, thus opening 
a different set of connotations and methodologies. Leadership capital is taken to be the 
aggregate of a leader’s political resources: skills (both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ see Nye 2008), 
relations and reputation. We first examine the theoretical roots of the concept. We then 
present three main forms of leadership capital, before introducing the Leadership Capital 
Index (LCI), offering forms of measurement and its application via a short case study of Tony 
Blair. We subsequently illustrate its possible uses and conclude by outlining avenues for 
further developing, testing and applying the LCI.  
Varieties of Capital  
Capital is recognised as ‘a surplus, something that you have beyond sufficiency that enables 
you to do something else of value’ (Renshon 2000: 203). Pierre Bourdieu conceptualised 
three fundamental guises of capital as: economic (money and property), cultural (cultural 
goods and services including educational credentials), and social (acquaintances and 
networks) (Bourdieu 1986: 242). The latter has spawned more than 4000 academic studies, 
largely on the back of Robert Putnam’s influential works, examining its measurement and 
effects (Campbell 2013: 29).  
Bourdieu (1986, 2005) also discerned political capital, a manifestation less developed than 
the other three forms of ‘capital’ he had initially presented. He described it as:   
A form of symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, 
more precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a 
person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it) (in 
Schugurensky 2000: 4). 
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To Bourdieu the aim of political power is to ‘impose beliefs’ and ‘recognized principles’ 
(2005: 39). To do so, he explained, ‘one needs to be credible, to command credit, to have 
accumulated a capital of belief, of specific authority’ (Bourdieu 2005, 39, our emphasis). It 
also requires differentiation, to create a ‘distinctive, differential capital’ that allows the 
politician to stand out (2005: 39). To understand a politician’s position requires analysis of 
their background, their ‘relations of dependence’ with other powerful actors or groups and 
their ‘position in the political game’ whether a purist political actor, remote from the world 
or one connected to other ‘fields’ (2005: 34). Bourdieu highlights the ambiguous position of 
political capital as both symbolic and concrete power. Sometimes political capital is 
‘symbolic power ….an aggregate reflection of other capital forms possessed by powerful 
institutions and actors (meta-capital)’ while ‘elsewhere…it becomes something to be 
accumulated as a capital form’ (Davis and Seymour 2010: 741). Notwithstanding this 
ambiguity, what is essential is that political capital is in part self-reinforcing (or self-
destructing) as ‘authority…comes in part from the effect that it produces’ (Bourdieu 2005: 
39).  
Bourdieu’s ideas enable us to identify three key points about the nature of political capital. 
First, having skills to become and remain a political leader is crucial. The process of 
leadership ascendancy begins as ‘individual politicians make use of their capital forms in 
order to win…struggles and progress within political hierarchies’ to achieve power, creating 
a  ‘distinctive’ image and path (Davis and Seymour 2010: 742; Bourdieu 2005: 39). It then 
follows that leadership consists of a ‘continuous …struggle’ to ‘maintain ascendancy’ (Davis 
and Seymour 2010: 741). 
Second, political capital is relational. Bourdieu saw ‘political power’ as being ‘derived by 
politicians from trust (expressed in a form of credit)’ from the public, though he viewed it as 
a capacity ‘to mobilise’ (Schugurensky 2000: 4). This connects political capital to public 
perceptions, with the media being a crucial linchpin between the two (Davis and Seymour 
2010: 742). Here a comparison can be again drawn with social capital, which is seen as a 
dense network of ‘credit’ (Coleman 1988), not unlike what novelist Tom Wolfe (1987) 
famously described as the ‘favor bank’: “Well, everything in this building . . . operates on 
favors. Everybody does favors for everybody else. Every chance they get, they make 
deposits in the Favor Bank.  A deposit in the Favor Bank is not a quid pro quo. It’s saving up 
for a rainy day…” So, relations and networks matter in the generation of political capital. 
Third, to Bourdieu low levels of public interest in the political process mean that political 
capital becomes an elite, leader and party centred pursuit with ‘politics…concentrated in the 
hands of professional politicians and bureaucrats, lead[ing] him to identify political capital 
only among political leaders or parties’ (Schugurensky 2000: 4). Once it is acquired, capital 
becomes part of a reputational cycle, a reciprocal process of leaders presenting ideas, 
undertaking actions and ‘getting things done’. Political capital is thus continually ‘contested’ 
and fought over by the media, public and politicians. Political capital is dynamic and 
contingent and can ‘be conserved only at the cost of unceasing work which is necessary 
both to accumulate credit and to avoid discredit…before the tribunal of public opinion’ 
(Bourdieu, in Schugurensky 2000: 5; Davis and Seymour 2010: 742).  
Various interpretations of political capital have been offered. It has been theorised as a 
‘vertical’ version of ‘horizontal’ social capital, a developing and dynamic relationship 
between politician and citizen (see Seyd and Whiteley 1997; Novicevic and Harvey 2004). 
We present a systemic tool drawn from such theoretical approaches. 
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Leadership Capital 
Leadership capital is ‘a broad term that has cultural, social, and symbolic aspects’ (Nepstad 
and Clifford 2006) but analysts agree that one way or the other at its heart are social, 
indeed public, judgments about individual skills, abilities advantages and ‘achievements’ 
(Davis and Seymour 2010; Sørensen and Torfing 2003). It has been described as a 
combination of ‘competence, integrity and capacities for leadership’ (Renshon 2000: 200). It 
is driven and shaped by ‘ambition, integrity and relatedness’, can be ‘accumulated or 
depleted’ and is deeply ‘embedded’ within specific cultures and contexts (Renshon 2000: 
200). Leadership capital is ‘a broad term that has cultural, social, and symbolic aspects’ 
(Nepstad and Clifford 2006) but analysts agree that one way or the other at its heart are 
social, indeed public, judgments about individual skills, abilities advantages and 
‘achievements’ (Davis and Seymour 2010; Sørensen and Torfing 2003). John Kane (2001), for 
example, has tied a leader’s capital to the establishment of moral authority (Kane, 2001). In 
examining the political capital of George W. Bush, Schier (2009) defined capital as a 
combination of formal and informal power, a mix of ‘party support of the president in 
Congress, public approval of the president’s conduct of his job, the President’s electoral 
margin and patronage appointments’ (Schier 2009: 5).  
The notion of leadership capital allows us to see the difference between being in office and 
being in power. Students of political leadership have long wrestled with the virtu-fortuna, 
structure-agency question: the extent to which the actions of leaders are determined or 
constrained by forces beyond the leader’s control. Some leaders continuously scan their 
contexts for opportunities and challenges, and allocate their attention accordingly. Other 
leaders take a more reactive and intuitive stance. Leadership capital helps to reflect the 
reality of leadership: that it is the dynamic interplay between individual capabilities and 
contextual conditions both that shapes leaders’ ability to act and their careers and legacies 
(Hargrove 2002: 199; Hargrove and Owen 2003). Also, political psychologists have 
discovered that some leaders’ personality characteristics predispose them to accept 
contextual constraints as given, whereas others are more predisposed to challenge them 
(Keller, 2005; Antonakis 2011; Davis and Gardner 2012). Yet situations are never a given. 
Things happening ‘out there’ are perceived and understood differently by political actors: 
‘the economy’, ‘the Zeitgeist’ or ‘the geostrategic situations’ are assigned meaning in media 
stories which are framed in particular ways - often with strategic intent. Such meaning-
making contests are pivotal in mediating the effects of situations upon leaders’ political 
capital (see Skowronek 1993, 2010; ‘t Hart and Uhr 2011; Laing and McCaffrie 2013; ‘t Hart 
2014). The view of these narratives themselves may also shift over time: Thatcher and 
Reagan’s ‘pro- free market small state’ narrative is viewed differently post 2007 crash than 
it was in the boom years of the late 1990s. The combination of skills, relations and 
reputation offers a way into understanding this.  
Institutional parameters vary, as may the situational context within which the leader must 
operate. Elgie (1995) sensibly proposed an interactionist approach, combining the personal 
and systemic aspects of the leadership process, whereby political leaders operate within an 
environment ‘which will both structure their behaviour and constrain their freedom of 
action’. This implies that ‘political leaders do have the opportunity to shape the 
environment in which they operate’ (Helms 2005), or as Riker (1986: ix) put it ‘structuring 
situations so you can win’ only when the leadership environment actually allows such 
restructuring (see Greenstein, 1969; Hargrove and Owens, 2003). But to do so, they need 
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not just skills but authority, conceived of here as a warrant to challenge and alter 
institutional traditions and path dependencies. Leadership capital provides a measure for 
what one might call the ‘aggregate authorisation’ a political actor enjoys from his 
‘authorizing environment’ (Moore, 1995), in other words a composite measure of their 
warrant to lead. Having a healthy ‘stock’ of political capital confers on a leader the power to 
persuade and motivate as well as compel indeed the ability to ‘resolve dilemmas’ (Renshon 
2000: 223). 
Figure 1: Components of Leadership Capital 
 
Figure 1 offers a breakdown of the constituent parts of leadership capital. Skills capital 
refers to attributed abilities of the leader, e.g. their cognitive, physical, communicative and 
managerial capacity. Political psychologists who study the impact of personality on 
leadership reminds us that ‘who leads matters’. For example, US presidential scholar Fred 
Greenstein (2010) distinguished six key skill areas of leadership style to describe and 
diagnose the performance of the holders of that office. Greenstein’s categories provide 
useful shorthand for comparing and contrasting the personal styles of different political 
leaders, and not just US presidents (Daleus, 2012). His effort is just one among many who 
have tried to capture key dimensions of politicians’ leadership styles and skills and to 
develop them into predictive and/or evaluative performance assessment instruments 
(Kaarbo, 1997; Preston, 2001; Cronin 2008; Post, 2005; Hermann, 2013; see also Nye, 2008).  
Such efforts make bold assumptions about the direct impact of skills on performance, at the 
risk of sidestepping the fundamentally perceptual and deeply political environment in which 
leaders operate. What really matters is the competencies that are projected on to leaders 
by their authorizing environment: the actors and institutions whose support is essential for 
them to maintain the ability to lead. The nature and scope of these authorizing 
environments varies across political systems and situations. It may include any or all of the 
following: the armed forces, media owners and editors, party barons, key industrialists, 
trade union elites, voters in marginal seats, celebrity endorsers, and so on. The nature of the 
mix varies across time and space. But, as Machiavelli reminds us, what is crucial for reaching 
and consolidating leadership positions are perceptions of a leader’s skills among key 
constituents. These are the personal attributes an individual brings to the post and deploys 
in holding office and/or exercising leadership,  pragmatically separated into ‘hard’ 
(transactional) and ‘soft’ (inspirational) skills (Nye 2008: 83).  
Leadership 
Capital 
s1 Skills 
(Soft) 
s2 Skills 
(Hard) 
r1  
Relations 
R2 
Reputation 
6  
Relational capital refers to the loyalties that leaders mobilise. Why people follow or at least 
accept that leaders matters a great deal in shaping the authority and influence of leaders 
(Turner et al, 2008). Some leader-constituent relationships are characterized by fierce, 
unconditional and enduring loyalty. In case of charismatic leadership, constituents become 
fully formed ‘followers’ whose loyalty is unconditional, indeed ‘blind’ (Davis and Gardner 
2012, Aviolo and Yammarino 2013). Other leader-follower relationships are much more 
cerebral, contingent and ephemeral. Understanding leadership, in other words, involves 
grasping the ‘dynamic interplay of wants, needs, motives, values, and capacities of both 
would-be leaders and their potential followers’ (Burns 2003: 16). Social psychology and 
sociology provide a rich reservoir of insights about the composition, social categorizations 
and identifications, and leadership expectations of followers and constituents. These are key 
to understanding the nature of the psychological contract that develops between them and 
their representatives (Cronin 2008; Reicher et al, 2010). This contract extends beyond the 
circle of party members or movement followers. It can also be usefully applied to capture 
the relations between leaders and the media and the wider electorate (Davis 2010). 
Leadership relations differ in the kind of psychological contract that underpins them. Burns 
(1978) picked up on this in making his classic distinction between transformational and 
transactional leaders, but by now there are many other salient distinctions (Brett 2009; 
Reicher and Haslam 2013). The ‘visionary’, transformational leader first and foremost hopes 
to gather capital through a mobilizing story of ideals and aspirations, and is prepared to risk 
the political costs  of ideological opposition to it and of delivered realities falling short of 
evoked expectations. In contrast, pragmatic, transactional leaders bank primarily on 
acquiring capital through technical competence and tangible achievements at the risk of 
leaving a vacuum of meaning and identification for their political competitors to fill. This 
divide cuts across holders of the same office: German chancellors Willy Brandt versus 
Helmut Schmidt, Australian prime ministers Gough Whitlam versus Malcolm Fraser, 
Canadian prime ministers Pierre Trudeau versus Brian Mulroney, and American presidents 
George W. Bush versus George H.W. Bush.  
 
Each type of leadership claim sets up its own performance test. Moralizing leaders need ‘to 
walk their talk’. Idealist leaders need to be seen to be taking risks and making sacrifices for 
the values they believe in. Pragmatists need to demonstrate competence and ‘bring home 
the bacon’. This brings us to the third component: reputational capital. Leaders’ words and 
deeds are constantly monitored and assessed. Followers, observers and critics alike all try to 
distil a ‘narrative’ about what a leader ‘is really like’ from the pattern of that leader’s 
behaviour and its observable impact. For each leader such a narrative emerges. Though only 
partially shaped and controlled by the leader herself. This narrative forms the core of a 
leader’s reputation. A leader’s reputation increases leadership capital when it meets two 
conditions: its normative core is seen by the observer as appropriate for the times; and the 
gap between perceived promise and observed performance is seen as limited or caused by 
exogenous, temporary circumstances. Effective reputations are coherent believable 
narratives in which a leader’s life story, espoused philosophy and observable in-office 
behaviour are widely deemed to be in alignment. 
 
The Leadership Capital Index 
The Leadership Capital Index (LCI) is a diagnostic tool for tracking the strength of leader’s 
political mandates. It seeks to combine the elements identified of ‘competence, integrity 
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and capacity ‘with reputational and integrity that form the basis of political capital (Renshon 
2000; Schier 2009; Kane 2001).  
The LCI helps us spot key variations in the nature and aggregate volume of leadership 
capital. It can be applied to discrete leaders, but also in a comparative, ‘league table’ 
fashion. It is designed to systematically track and compare leadership capital. The index is 
the sum of the 3 elements of skills (soft and hard (s1+2), relations (r1) and reputation (r2). As 
an aggregate, the LCI is useful in understanding and looking across the key strengths and 
weaknesses of leaders. The LCI brings in a further range of ideas, merging perceptions 
(trust) and concrete performance (election victories or legislation). The Index can further be 
presented as a simple equation based on these 3 elements. 
LCI = ∑{𝑠1+2 + 𝑟1 + 𝑟2}  
The LCI measures leadership as an aggregate of three attributes: skills, relations and 
reputation. These three criteria can be operationalised in a way that is similar to composite 
macro-economic indexes that are widely used by the financial markets or social indexes 
such as the Global Democracy Index, Social Capital Index and National Intellectual Capital 
Index. The whole point of the exercise is that the LCI has the potential to generate a more 
nuanced picture of a leader’s ‘license to operate’, both in time and over time, than the 
common job approval and poll ratings are able to provide. The index is the sum of the three 
key criteria of skills (soft and hard (s1+2), relations (r1) and reputation (r2). Users of the index 
can decide whether and how to accord weights to each of these three criteria sets. By way 
of example, Table 1 provides an operationalisation of the LCI for political party leaders, with 
the three general criteria of skills, relations and reputations transformed into indicators 
inspired mainly by Greenstein’s (2010) competencies framework for US presidents and 
Bulpitt’s (1986) statecraft theory of political leadership. Most indicators require rating by 
the analyst or, preferably, an expert panel; some indicators can be applied by consulting 
publicly available election, polling and attitude survey data.  
Table 1. The Leadership Capital Index of a Political Party Leader  
Criteria Indicators Measurements 
S1 01 Political/policy vision 1. Completely absent 
2. Unclear/inconsistent 
3. Moderately clear/consistent 
4. Clear/consistent 
5. Very clear/consistent 
S1 02 Communicative performance 1. Very poor 
2. Poor 
3. Average  
4. Good 
5. Very good 
S2 03 Personal poll rating relative to 
rating at most recent election  
1. Very low (<-15%) 
2. Low (-5 to -15%) 
3. Moderate (-5% to 5%) 
4. 1-5 
5. 5-10 
S2 04 Longevity: time in office 1. <1 year 
2. 1 – 2 years 
3. 2 – 3 years 
4. 3 - 4 years 
5. >4 years 
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S2 05 (Re)election margin for the party 
leadership  
1. Very small (<1% of relevant electors, i.e. caucus, 
party members) 
2. Small (1-5%) 
3. Moderate (5-10%) 
4. Large (10-15%) 
5. Very large (>15%) 
R1 06 Party polling relative to most 
recent election result 
1. <-10% 
2. -10% to-2.5% 
3. -2.5% to 2.5% 
4. 2.5% to 10% 
5. >10% 
R1 07 Levels of public trust in leader 1. 0-20% 
2. 20-40% 
3. 40-60% 
4. 60-80% 
5. 80-100% 
R1 08 Likelihood of credible leadership 
challenge within next 6 months 
1. Very low 
2. Low 
3. Moderate 
4. High 
5. Very high 
R2 09 Perceived ability to shape party’s 
policy platform  
1. Very low 
2. Low 
3. Moderate 
4. High 
5. Very high 
R2 10 Perceived parliamentary 
effectiveness 
1.     Very low 
2.     Low 
3.     Moderate 
4.     High 
5.     Very high 
 
Much of the data required to perform a LCI analysis of a particular leader is available from 
public sources, such as election results, opinion polls and the parliamentary record. Some of 
the data is likely to be an aggregate or composite of numerous views. For example, 
assessment of the various ‘skills’ (S1, S2) indicators can be based on biography and 
examples drawn from the media or academic assessment. Where data is limited or 
unavailable, it may be that other proxies are used such as approval rating for trust. Once the 
analysis is undertaken, the data can then be ‘scored’ to allow a rating of a leader on the LCI. 
A provisional overall interpretive assessment is given in Table 2 with illustrative examples 
leaders arguably fitting into the various categories. 
Table 2: Aggregating and interpreting LCI scores 
Ratings  Description Examples  
0-20 Depleted capital: edge of removal or ‘lame duck’ Australian Prime Minister Julia 
Gillard in the 12 months prior to 
her removal  (2012-2013) 
20-30 Low capital: ‘politically weakened’ but still capable of 
some action 
British PM John Major, 1994-97 in 
face of intraparty rebellion over 
EU policy  
30-40 Medium capital: ‘muddling through’ in the face of 
significant obstacles and divisions, yet with provisional 
license to operate from (small majority within) the 
authorizing environment 
US president Obama following his 
2012 re-election  
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40-50 High capital: ‘momentum’ derived from robust past 
electoral/legislative performance and party cohesion  
Canadian PM Steven Harper 
following his 2011 re-election 
50-60 Exceptional capital: ‘political weather maker’ boosted by 
electoral landslide, and/or personal dominance and/or 
‘good crises to have’  
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
following Berlin Wall collapse 
 
The LCI thus offers a composite portrait of the shifting mix of skills, relation and reputation 
that can strengthen or weaken a leader. The scoring system will also help draw out the 
nuances of a leader. The LCI will reveal, for example, a leader who may have communication 
abilities but be a poor manager. It may also show apparently strong leaders, winning 
elections but hobbled by poor party unity or challenger, which may in turn affect the 
passage of legislation.  
The LCI combines straightforward use of publicly available data (indicators 3-7) with 
measures that have to be constructed intersubjectively, i.e. through the use of an expert 
panel or working with multiple coders using an identical dataset and a systematic code book 
and ascertaining intercoder reliability scores (indicators 1-2, 8-10). This reflects the 
inherently multifaceted nature of the phenomenon that is political leadership. And it 
reflects the fact that the unit of analysis is leadership capital, in other words other people’s 
judgments of a leader’s quality and viability in the role. These are necessarily ‘in the eye of 
the beholder’ – e.g. indicators such as policy vision or communicative performance.  
As with the ‘natural rate of governability’ some of the subjective measures are context-
dependent (Bullpit 1986; Buller and James 2012). What are considered assets (skills, 
achievements or victories) in one setting may not be in another setting. This may vary from 
person to person or group to group: Renshon speaks of there being not one but ‘several’ 
public ‘psychologies’ assessing leaders (2000: 208). Renshon argues that building capital is 
not all catch-all race for the widest support: one leader as a unifier (a Churchill) may build 
capital through widening ‘national’ support: others (a Thatcher) may do so through division 
and strengthening a ‘core’ support of particular groups (2000: 207).  
Utilising and Interpreting the Leadership Capital Index 
Much work is still required to develop alternative and complementary operationalisations of 
the LCI for different classes of political leaders (heads of government, ministers, opposition 
leaders, social movement leaders). Whilst the LCI presents a potential starting point for new 
approaches to understanding and evaluating political leadership, it is worth reflecting a little 
more on the potential applications of LCI-based analyses in the study of political leadership.  
The trajectory of leadership capital 
Leadership capital can be assessed as a snapshot (at time T) or as a film (trajectory T1->Tx). 
The latter opens up the opportunity for empirical testing of the long-established assertion 
that leadership tenures follow roughly three developmental stages: acquiring, managing, 
and losing leadership capital (Breslauer, 2002: 13). Each leadership trajectory is said to 
evolve through these stages, though not necessarily in linear or predictable fashion. 
Leadership capital gathering requires a struggle to the top, as with Bourdieu’s political 
capital. Acquiring enough leadership capital to obtain high office is just the start. Capital 
must thus be leveraged to ‘make a difference’ in public policy while one can. It takes time, 
skill and luck to accumulate (Davis and Seymour 2010). That being the case, leaders can only 
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spend it every so often. However, unlike financial capital, which prudent managers can 
sustain over very long periods of time, political leaders experience growing tension between 
their desire to lead and the near-inevitable growing downward pressure on their capital.   
Over time, leaders may be found wanting in some way, have their limitations exposed or 
simply run out of energy or enthusiasm. Two temporal perspectives are important to 
distinguish. Leaders may score highly in the daily battle, but lose in the long-term: Gordon 
Brown was famously a tactician, spending capital day-to-day to ‘win’ but failed to deploy it 
strategically (Seldon and Lodge 2010). Australian Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam 
articulated one of the most ambitious and far-reaching policy visions in recent memory for 
his 1972 government, but squandered the capital it conferred in three years through inept 
management of the day-to-day governmental process (Walter 1980). 
In policy terms, the longer the incumbency then the higher the chance of a major policy 
defeat, fiasco or scandal. And time has a way of dumping the occasional external crisis on a 
leader’s doorstep: wars, disasters, terrorist attacks, and economic downturns. These 
provide high-stakes performance tests at an altogether different level of intensity, which 
some leaders will cherish and other will see flounder.  
Great political skills and propitious political and economic contexts cannot halt the 
inevitable (though not monotonous or steep) decline of a leader’s authority and the natural 
‘trajectory’ of leadership capital deprecation. The tension between hoarding and spending 
capital and the impact of what one might call the natural rate of capital attrition over time 
becomes progressively more difficult to manage, to the point that a very large percentage of 
all democratic party and government leaders are forced one way or the other to leave office 
before they themselves feel ready (Laing and ‘t Hart 2011). Denver and Garnett’s (2012: 71) 
meta-analysis of opinion polling data found ‘it is certainly the case that all prime ministers 
leave office less popular then when they began. Most have ups and downs… but in the end 
the trend is inexorably downwards.’ Figure 2 offers an ideal typical depiction of an arc of 
leadership capital, within which the LCI may be plotted over the leadership tenure, in which 
ascendance precedes performance, and eventual political decline. The evolution of 
leadership capital can be identified along the lines of an inverted U trajectory (‘t Hart and 
Bynander 2006: 722).  
Figure 2: The Natural Trajectory of Leadership Capital 
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The LCI can be utilised to plot the diachronic trajectory of various leader to test whether this 
general assertion is correct, as well as to explore if there are typical patterns of leadership 
capital evolution. The next step in the analysis is then to explore the correlates or ideally the 
causes of such variations. From a short- term perspective a high amount of leadership 
capital should enable leaders both to momentarily survive in office and at the same time 
exercise effective leadership, prevailing in a particular contest with interest groups, 
opposition or the media. From a long-term perspective on office-holding, high levels of 
leadership capital should be associated with a lack of internal competitors, low levels of 
intraparty factionalism, stable and robust legislative majorities, successful re-election and 
thus long lasting leaders tenures.  
The contested ownership of leadership capital 
The accrual or decline of leadership capital is shaped by numerous groups including the 
leader and their key allies, the wider party, the media and the public (Garzia 2011). The flow 
of leadership capital is thus dynamic and contingent. Its ebbs and flows amount to a ‘battle 
for the narrative’ or ‘battle for control’ of the capital, resulting in a less linear tenure (Kane 
and Patapan 2012). In this ‘battle’ leaders can do different things to try to maintain 
ascendancy. One technique is to project leaders as ‘one of us’, and offer a hopeful vision of 
where ‘we’ can move towards (Subasic and Reynolds 2011). Such ‘identity 
entrepreneurship’ was displayed effectively by post-authoritarian nation-rebuilding 
democrats such as Vaclav Havel and Nelson Mandela (Hopkins and Reicher in Till 2011: 75; 
Kane 2001). Another option, particularly for the transformational or charismatic leader, is to 
offer up integrity and trust as a bond, attached to a promise of decisive change (Pillai et al 
2003: 168). Alternatively leaders can offer stability after uncertainty or ‘healing’ after 
division. The issue of what leaders can do to control narratives and how successful they are 
at it is another promising area of future research.  
Using the Leadership Capital Index: The example of Tony Blair, January-May 2005 
To demonstrate the applicability of the LCI, the following analysis examines the case of Tony 
Blair as Prime Minister, choosing the five months between January and the General Election 
of May 2005, eight years into his premiership and two years before his departure. The work 
uses available data combined with insights from biography and autobiography.  
One qualification is that Blair offers a particularly fruitful area. Not only is there voluminous 
assessment of his time in office and legacy but also detailed studies of his parliamentary 
party (Cowley 2005), media perceptions and trust in Blair as a leader (Karp et al 2011: 2012) 
his own autobiography (Blair 2010) and academic and popular research into his legacy 
(Bennister 2009, 2012; Theakston 2012). Other leaders may require alternative proxies (for 
instance approval ratings instead of trust). The approach taken here is not intended to be 
prescriptive but offers an example of a way in which it can be done.   
Table 3: LCI Measure of Tony Blair January-May 2005 
Criteria Indicators Measurements Sources and summary 
S1 01 Political/policy vision 1. Completely absent 
2. Unclear/inconsistent 
3. Moderately 
clear/consistent 
4. Clear/consistent 
5. Very clear/consistent 
Moderated aims and ‘vision’. 
Kavanagh (2005) Hennessy 
(2001) Seldon (2005) Seldon 
(2007) 
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S1 02 Communicative 
performance 
1. Very poor 
2. Poor 
3. Average  
4. Good 
5. Very good 
Very strong communicator.  
(Kavanagh 2005, 18) (Seldon 
2005, 698). 
S2 03 Personal poll rating 
relative to opposition 
leader  
1. Very low (<-15%) 
2. Low (-5 to -15%) 
3. Moderate (-5% to 5%) 
4. 1-5 
5. 5-10 
Fluctuated between 10 and 15 
points ahead in polling.  
UK Polling Report (2011) 
S2 04 Longevity: time in office 1. <1 year 
2. 1 – 2 years 
3. 2 – 3 years 
4. 3 - 4 years 
5. >4 years 
Blair in office for 104 months 
by 2005. 
Seldon (2007) 
S2 05 (Re)election margin for 
the party leadership  
1. Very small (<1% of relevant 
electors, i.e. caucus, party 
members) 
2. Small (1-5%) 
3. Moderate (5-10%) 
4. Large (10-15%) 
5. Very large (>15%) 
 Large margin of victory over 
other rivals but by 2005 was 9 
years ago (Kelly et al 2010)  
R1 06 Party polling relative to 
most recent election result 
1. <-10% 
2. -10% to-2.5% 
3. -2.5% to 2.5% 
4. 2.5% to 10% 
5. >10% 
Falling by an average of 
around 10 %.  
UK Polling Report (2005) 
R1 07 Levels of public trust in 
leader 
1. 0-20% 
2. 20-40% 
3. 40-60% 
4. 60-80% 
5. 80-100% 
Around 65 % did not ‘trust 
Blair to tell the truth’.  
YouGov/Sunday Times 2005) 
See also Karp et al (2011) and 
Karp and Stevens (2012) 
R1 08 Likelihood of credible 
leadership challenge within 
next 6 months 
1. Very  High 
2.  High 
3. Moderate 
4. Low 
5. Very Low 
Very high due to Chancellor 
Brown’s power, party support 
and position. 
Blair (2010) 
Seldon (2005) and Seldon 
(2007) 
R2 09 Percieved ability to 
shape party’s policy  
1. Very low 
2. Low 
3. Moderate 
4. High 
5. Very high 
Diminshing influence over 
policy. 
Blair (2010) 
Seldon (2005) 
R2 10 Perceived parliamentary 
effectiveness 
1.     Very low 
2.     Low 
3.     Moderate 
4.     High 
5.     Very high 
Rapidly diminshing influence in 
Parliament despite  large 
majority. 
Cowley (2005) 
Seldon (2007) 
 
S1 Vision and Communication.  
Although Blair was widely recognised during his premiership as a ‘transformist’ in intent and 
vision (Hennessy 2001; Seldon 2005), he ‘downplayed’ this in his second term opting instead 
for ‘reformist’ aims around public services and democratic renewal (Seldon 2005: 466-467). 
His strategy and vision were further undermined by Blair’s own tendency to become a ‘crisis 
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manager and headline seeker’ (Kavanagh 2005: 16). Blair retained even by 2005 a 
‘remarkable capacity to communicate’ (Kavanagh 2005: 18) both in set pieces and in 
impromptu settings, with his speech at the Davos conference in January 2005 on foreign aid 
an example of his continued skill (Seldon 2005: 698). 
S2 Polling, Longevity and Election 
In polling terms both Blair and his party experienced what his Chief of Staff described as a 
‘long, slow but seemingly inexorable slide into unpopularity’ rather than the series of ‘deep 
Us’ and ‘ploughs and troughs’ that marked the Thatcher governments (Powell 2010: 139). 
By 2005 both party and leader found their poll ratings declining. However, the poor ratings 
of the Conservative opposition leader, Michael Howard and the Conservative party in 
general meant the loss still left Blair and the Labour party ahead of their opponents. The 
average gap between Tony Blair and Michael Howard was 17 points when asked ‘who would 
make the best Prime Minister’ (UK Polling Report 2011).  
Up until January 2005 Blair had been Prime Minister for 104 months, one of the longest 
serving Post-war Prime Ministers. He also had a large margin of victory over other party 
rivals for the leadership. However, his election as party leader was 11 years in the past and 
largely irrelevant, especially given the scale of the challenge from Brown (Kelly et al 2010) 
R1 Polling, Trust and Challenge  
As with the leaders, the Labour party dropped an average of around 10 points between the 
General Elections of 2001 and 2005. However, the Conservative opposition remained 
behind by average of 5 percentage points in polls in this period (UK Polling Report 2005). 
For Blair’s personal ratings, in 2005 65 per cent of the public did not trust Blair to tell the 
truth, with 72 per cent citing the fact he ‘spins too much’ and 54 per cent that he lied to 
take Britain into war in Iraq (YouGov 2005). Iraq was central to Blair’s decline. Despite the 
free elections of January in Iraq there was continued violence and disorder and since 
September 2004 more than 50 per cent of polled respondents were against continued 
military action (Yougov 2013). The issue of Iraq and Blair’s integrity was continuously 
emphasised by the Conservative press (see Stevens and Karp 2012). Blair (2010: 511) spoke 
of feeling ‘under attack’. This was slightly offset by the presence of Labour supporting 
newspapers and the differing (and complex) approaches and effects of the Conservative 
attack (Stevens et al 2011).  
One of the essential components of any assessment of Blair’s capital is the strength of an 
alternate challenger in this period. His Chancellor Gordon Brown ‘agreed’ in 1994 to stand 
aside from the leadership contest in exchange for the Premiership after Blair. By 2005 the 
two men effectively ran the government as a ‘joint premiership’ or duarchy (Seldon 2007: 
337: Kavanagh 2005). The result by 2005 was a deeply divided government, fragmented into 
factions (Kavanagh 2007). Relations were so poor Blair considered sacking Brown but found 
he lacked the power to do so (2007: 330). Blair called this period ‘TB/GB’ and spoke of his 
chancellor as being in a ‘highly dangerous mood’. Blair felt that the Labour Party saw him as 
an ‘albatross’ and felt they could ‘renew under Brown’ (2010: 510-511). A poll in this period 
found Brown out polling Blair by 39 to 30 when respondents were asked who they would 
prefer as Prime Minister (YouGov/Daily Telegraph 2005).    
R2 Policy and Parliament 
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Blair in this period was a Prime Minister with a low and diminishing ability to shape policy. 
His attempt to set the agenda or push proposals was marked by numerous high profile 
failures. Between November 2004 and May 2005 eighteen pieces of legislation were passed. 
Domestic priority was given to health, education, law and order (Blair 2010: 504). This 
period saw the creation of Serious Organised Crime Agency and a Supreme Court for the UK. 
Yet it also saw the dropping of high profile and controversial policy to introduce national ID 
cards, associated with Blair himself and tied to national security, and a difficult passage for a 
key terrorism bill in both Commons and Lords (Cowley 2005). In foreign policy Blair 
encountered failure convening Middle East peace talks in London, where he was hindered 
by a lack of co-operation from the US and Israel (Seldon 2005: 318-319). He scored some 
partial success in seeking to set the agenda on climate change (Seldon 2007: 326-327). 
There was also criticism of Blair’s policy response to the January Tsunami, though his actions 
were supported in later polling (see YouGov 2005) 
Blair displayed a similar decline in his parliamentary control. Rebellion’s by Labour party 
backbench MPs were ‘frequent and widespread’ with sixty-one rebellions in the period 
(Cowley 2005: 226). As well as the ID cards revolt, there were a succession of serious 
rebellions on less high profile bills such as mental incapacity, gambling and railways (Cowley 
2005: 271). The rebellion over terrorism legislation culminated in a 28 hour session in 
March, pitching rebel MPs and members of the House of Lords against the government 
(Cowley 2005: 234, 272). 
Blair: The Analysis  
Overall, Blair scores 31 out of 50 (see table 3), classifying him just on the cusp as a medium 
capital leader: ‘muddling through’ in the face of significant obstacles and divisions, yet with 
provisional license to operate. There is an apparent paradox of a highly skilled and 
experienced Prime Minister, with an extremely large parliamentary majority of 167 and an 
unpopular opposition seemingly ‘struggling’ to act. Seldon speaks of Blair’s ‘vast unfulfilled 
potential’ marked only by ‘rhetoric and good intentions’ (2007: 691). The LCI helps to draw 
out why this is so. It shows how Blair’s strengths in maintaining capital lay in his skills, 
combined with his longevity. Blair could still influence and, score ‘victories’ for instance with 
his speech at Davos in January on foreign aid, his reaction to the Tsunami of January 2005 
(initially criticised but supported in opinion polls), or with his success in facilitating action on 
climate change. His longevity undoubtedly contributed to an understanding of his role, 
though the eight years may also induce fatigue. The final Blair ‘strength’ was one of fortune: 
the weakness of the opposition, which constituted a more unpopular party led by a more 
unpopular leader.  
The LCI also enables us to see where political capital is lost. An analysis of Blair’s leadership 
capital reveals four areas of loss. The first two areas are interlinked: Blair’s personal loss of 
trust and the strength of the challenge to his premiership. Rather than specific ‘crises’, Blair 
faced these two ‘slow burn’ problems contributing to a deterioration of his situation. The 
invasion and occupation of Iraq from 2003 onwards severely eroded Blair’s reputation and 
public trust in him. In parallel, Brown’s challenge and control of policy hampered Blair’s 
ability to make policy and impacted upon the loyalty of the party (Cowley 2005, Blair 2010). 
This fed into public perceptions, with 44 per cent feeling that the ‘feuding’ impeded 
government (YouGov/Daily Telegraph 2005). Brown’s challenge and status as ‘leader-in-
waiting’ was strengthened by Iraq, as Blair admitted (Blair 2010: 511).  
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These two capital ‘losses’ or ‘weakness’ then interacted with two further weaknesses: Blair’s 
loss of perceived policy strength and effectiveness in Parliament.  Blair’s policy weakness 
stemmed in part from the ‘Blair/Brown division’ which split policy into ‘fiefdoms’ and had a 
‘fundamental impact’ on Blair’s ability to govern (Richards 2011, 35-36). By 2005 there were 
only two ‘Blairites’ in Cabinet (Seldon 2007). Yet it was also his own choices; Blair’s reliance 
and damaging ‘link’ to US foreign policy in Iraq (and their lack of support) undermined the 
London Middle East Peace conference (Seldon 2007). Blair’s poor choice of Ministers for key 
departments and subsequent attempts to control them further undermined his policy 
influence (Seldon 2007: 697).   
In Parliament Blair’s legislative effectiveness was similarly low, despite having the third 
largest majority in Parliament’s history. Traditionally, parliamentary sessions before general 
elections are taken up with small and non-contentious bills. However, Blair made a poor 
strategic choice, deciding to pursue a full and unusually ‘contentious’ set of proposals, 
exacerbated by poor legislative strategy. The rebellions were driven by a combustible 
mixture of the Labour party’s growing support for Brown, anger over Iraq and, possibly, 
attempts by MPs to distance themselves from an unpopular government (Cowley 2005: 225-
234). However, they formed part of a broader shift in behaviour among MPs and the growth 
of a more ‘assertive’ legislature (Cowley 2005: 225-234).  
Earlier in his time as Prime Minister, Tony Blair sought to preserve his capital rather than 
‘spend’ it. Blair himself later recognised this: 
At first, in those early months and perhaps in much of that initial term of office, I had 
political capital that I tended to hoard. I was risking it but within strict limits and 
looking to recoup it as swiftly as possible… in domestic terms, I tried to reform with 
the grain of opinion not against it (Blair 2010: 123). 
However, one lesson from the LCI is that capital cannot be hoarded, even with a large 
majority and the range of skills Blair had at his disposal. The more time lapsed, the less 
control Blair appeared to have and the less could be done. A potent combination of party 
disloyalty, an alternative leader in Brown and popular distrust served to erode Blair’s capital 
and undermine both his ‘skills’ and attempts to pass legislation or take other ‘symbolic’ 
action. The LCI points to how these are linked. For example, Blair himself acknowledges that 
the party was rebellious partly because of the strength of his rival and partly because of 
Iraq. A weakness or drain on capital can undermine strength: while Blair retained his very 
strong communication skills, they proved less effective when a  growing proportion of the 
populace did not trust him to ‘tell the truth’ and the media emphasised his lack of integrity 
(Karp and Stevens 2012). 
Here the LCI can show us how an apparently strong leader can be seen to be weak in various 
key leverage actions. The drivers behind the falling poll numbers and behind the party 
rebellions point to the key issues where capital is weakening. Blair is thus kept in office on 
the one hand by his personal skills and structural advantage of the majority, though both 
appear subject to diminishing returns, but also by the negative factor of a less popular 
opposition. 
The LCI: Future Research 
The LCI outlined above presents a pathway to understand the dynamics of leadership. Such 
a pathway opens up several promising research opportunities. 
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First, individual aspects of the LCI can be investigated. The various components of the 
framework need to be tested and extended. For example, there could be closer study of 
aspects of perceptions of political skills or trust and how they link to other parts of the LCI: 
the case of Blair showed an interesting ‘chain reaction’ of one shift of the LCI impacting 
upon the other (Brown as rival triggered rebellions and disloyalty, further weakening Blair’s 
ability to ‘get things done’). Existing data sources on political leadership need to be mined 
and new ones established where necessary. Furthermore, the LCI provokes the question 
how is capital acquired and how is it then translated into performative capital once in office. 
There is also the issue of levels of leadership capital: how much capital is enough for leaders 
to survive, and become a consequential leader? There is a finite amount of capital that any 
leader is granted, but is there a tipping point - a point of no return? This further begs the 
question - in what situations can it be spent and how? If leadership capital can be indexed to 
what extent does it behave as financial capital does? There may be an analogous aspect to 
capital acquisition, but leadership capital cannot be hoarded. Capital maintenance is a 
constant struggle and one ‘locked in’ to an arc of decreasing power and authority. There 
may therefore be a case for looking at the idea of ‘investing political capital’ in the long term 
into particular projects, drawing on recent work on ‘political investments’ (see Bertelli and 
John 2011). A leader may ‘invest’ their stock in a particular programme over a long 
timeframe that may not immediately see a political ‘return’. This could be an attempt to 
restructure the economy or society in some fundamental way or involve the reorientation of 
the values of a society. 
Second, the LCI requires further development in terms of case studies or examples to 
demonstrate the heuristic potential of the LCI and the conceptual framework in which it is 
embedded. These can be via case studies of particular leaders over time, snapshots or 
between leaders in similar or different contexts: a most similar or different approach may 
draw out some of the links within the LCI matrix. An alternative would be to move towards a 
league table approach of leadership, building on earlier approaches such as expert surveys 
and ranking exercises (O’Malley 2007; Strangio et al 2013; Theakston and Gill 2011).   
Third, comparative case study analysis can offer a conceptual map of interpretive 
possibilities in understanding, studying and comparing the political fortunes and legacies of 
different political leaders. This could include leaders who maintain leadership capital over 
long periods of time, maintained through communication and strong links to allies and 
supporters, particularly those who cultivate ‘national’ images. There are also those that 
rapidly lose it (such as Gerald Ford or Gordon Brown) or those who diminish it by staying too 
long (a Thatcher or second term Churchill). One particularly interesting area is the rare 
leader able to ‘bounce back’ and retrieve or recoup, at least to some extent, leadership 
capital lost. Tenacious ‘comeback’ leaders such as Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton, Francois 
Mitterrand or John Howard belie the notion of the inverted U as the only possible shape of a 
leadership capital trajectory. Enoch Powell may have been right with his famous observation 
that all political lives end in failure, but some leaders have a way of acquiring a new lease of 
life when most observers have already declared them politically dead. How and why that 
happens in some cases and not in others is a fascinating puzzle that LCI-analysis is well 
suited to address. 
In sum, the LCI has the potential to provide a rich, nuanced, comparative and diachronic 
analysis of political leadership. It taps into relational rather than trait- or competency-based 
theories of leadership, which fits the larger development of the political leadership studies 
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field (Helms 2012; Strangio et al 2013; Rhodes and ‘t Hart 2014). Thinking about leadership 
in terms of capital and doing the hard yards of actually trying to measure it over time can 
help rid us of the shadows of ‘Great Man’ and other leader-centric theories of leadership 
that have dominated the field for decades but have yielded surprisingly little robust 
knowledge helpful to political scientists.   
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